The U.S. Cyber Force is the subject of a power struggle within the Pentagon.

• In September, the Pentagon formally requested Congress to reject a proposal for an independent U.S. Cyber Force.
• Supporters of the plan contend that a specialized cyber division would enhance the country's capacity to combat intensifying threats from adversaries such as China and Russia.
• During his first term, President-elect Donald Trump released a comprehensive national cybersecurity plan in 2018, which granted significant authority to the Department of Homeland Security while also assigning crucial responsibilities to the DoD in the areas of national security and geopolitics.

This week, a U.S. senator labeled the recent Chinese cyber-espionage attack on the nation's major telecom networks, which may have affected the communications of President-elect Donald Trump and Vice President-elect J.D. Vance, as "the most serious telecom hack in our history."

The full extent of what China achieved and whether its spies remain in U.S. communication networks is still unknown by the U.S.

Senator Mark Warner of Virginia, who chairs the Senate Intelligence Committee, informed the New York Times on Thursday that the barn door is mostly open.

The government disagrees on how to combat cyber threats linked to geopolitical rivals, with some advocating for an independent federal U.S. Cyber Force. In September, the Department of Defense urged Congress to reject this approach.

The Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a national security think tank, is among the most prominent voices advocating for the new branch, but the issue extends far beyond any single group. In June, defense committees in both the House and Senate approved measures calling for independent evaluations of the feasibility to create a separate cyber branch, as part of the annual defense policy deliberations.

The FDD's 40-page report, based on insights from over 75 active-duty and retired military officers with experience in cyber operations, highlights the persistent structural problems within the U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), including disjointed recruitment and training practices across the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines.

The FDD stated that America's cyber force generation system is broken, as Army General Paul Nakasone, who took over the role of U.S. Cyber Command in 2018, described the current U.S. military cyber organization as unsustainable. Nakasone had stated in 2023 that "all options are on the table, except the status quo."

Concern with Congress and a changing White House

The FDD analysis highlights "deep concerns" among members of both parties in Congress about the military's ability to defend cyberspace effectively. Talent shortages, inconsistent training, and misaligned missions are hindering CYBERCOM's capacity to respond to complex cyber threats. Proponents argue that creating a dedicated branch would improve the U.S.'s position in cyberspace. However, the Pentagon cautions that such a move could disrupt coordination, increase fragmentation, and weaken U.S. cyber readiness.

The Trump administration could have a significant impact on whether the U.S. adopts a centralized cyber strategy or maintains the current integrated approach that emphasizes inter-agency coordination.

Trump's 2018 National Cyber Strategy prioritized integrating cyber capabilities across all aspects of national power and fostering cross-departmental coordination and public-private partnerships instead of establishing a separate cyber agency. At the time, the Trump administration centralized civilian cybersecurity efforts under the Department of Homeland Security while assigning the Department of Defense with addressing complex, defense-related cyber threats. Trump's Secretary of Homeland Security nominee, South Dakota Governor Kristi Noem, has emphasized her state's focus on cybersecurity.

Trump officials predict that a second Trump administration will prioritize a tough stance on national security, filling gaps at the Energy Department, and easing regulatory burdens on businesses. They anticipate a heightened focus on cyber attacks, customized threat protection, and closer collaboration between federal and local governments. The head of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Jen Easterly, has announced she will depart once Trump is inaugurated.

Cyber Command 2.0 and the U.S. military

John Cohen, the executive director of the Program for Countering Hybrid Threats at the Center for Internet Security, agrees with the Pentagon's concerns about the need for a unified approach to cybersecurity. "We cannot continue to operate in silos," Cohen warned, emphasizing the importance of integrating cyber operations with other critical military efforts to avoid further isolation.

Cohen highlighted that adversaries such as China and Russia use cyber tactics as part of comprehensive strategies that encompass economic, physical, and psychological components. To counter these threats, he contended, the U.S. must adopt a unified approach across its military branches. "Addressing this necessitates our military adapting to the evolving battlefield in a uniform manner," he stated.

In 2018, CYBERCOM certified its Cyber Mission Force teams as fully staffed, but concerns have been raised by the FDD and others that personnel were shifted between teams to meet staffing goals, which they claim masked deeper structural problems. Nakasone has called for a CYBERCOM 2.0, stating in early 2021 that the approach to military staffing within the command needs to be rethought.

Austin Berglas, a former head of the FBI's cyber program in New York, believes that a separate cyber force could enhance U.S. capabilities by centralizing resources and priorities. He said that when he first took over the program, the assets were scattered, but centralization brought focus and efficiency. Berglas, who is now the global head of professional services at supply chain cyber defense company BlueVoyant, emphasizes the need for specialized training, advancement, and resource allocation that isn't diluted by competing military priorities.

Berglas highlighted the ongoing "cyber arms race" with adversaries such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. He cautioned that without a dedicated force, the U.S. risks falling behind as these nations expand their offensive cyber capabilities and exploit vulnerabilities across critical infrastructure.

Since 2013, when U.S. Cyber Command started developing its Cyber Mission Force to tackle counterterrorism and financial cybercrime originating from Iran, a lot has changed. According to Nakasone, the current world is vastly different from the one we lived in then. He pointed out the threats posed by China and Russia as reasons for this shift.

Brandon Wales, a former executive director of the CISA, advised that the U.S. needs to enhance its cyber capabilities, but he warned against significant structural changes amidst an increased global threat landscape.

"The reorganization of this scale will be disruptive and time-consuming, as stated by Wales, who is now the vice president of cybersecurity strategy at SentinelOne," said Wales.

He argued that the U.S. military should maintain readiness due to China's preparations for a potential conflict over Taiwan. Instead of establishing a new branch, Wales supports initiatives like Cyber Command 2.0 and its goal of improving coordination and capabilities within the existing framework. He emphasized that large reorganizations should be a last resort due to their disruptive nature.

Wales emphasizes the importance of ensuring any structural changes do not compromise integration across military branches and recognizes the criticality of coordination across existing branches to address the complex, multidomain threats posed by U.S. adversaries. He advised against assuming that centralization is the solution to all problems and emphasized the need to enhance capabilities both defensively and offensively. He stated that this is not about one solution but about ensuring the ability to quickly see, stop, disrupt, and prevent threats from hitting critical infrastructure and systems.